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Abstract: In this paper, we will propose a new synchronous stream cipher 
named DICING, which can be viewed as a clock-controlled one but with a new 
mechanism of altering steps. With the simple construction, DICING has 
satisfactory performance, faster than AES about two times. For the security, 
there have not been found weakness for the known attacks, the key sizes can 
be 128bits and 256bits respectively.  
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1. Introduction  
 
In a synchronous stream cipher, the ciphertext is generally made by bitwise adding (XOR) the 
plaintext with a binary sequence called keystream. In case that the cipher is abused or the plaintext 
of some ciphertext are known by some people, and so the keystream will become visible for them, 
the analysis for this case is called the plaintext-known analysis, a secure keystream should satisfy 
two basic conditions: The first is that the original key can not be recovered from the keystream, 
the second is that the contents of the bits in the keystream should be unpredictable for an 
adversary, in other words, for the adversaries the keystream should look like a random one, i.e. 
pseudo-random. Clearly, if the keystream sequence is periodic and the period is short, then it will 
be predictable, thus the keystream should have enough large period. It is known that the technique 
of the linear feedback shift registers (LFSR) is able to generate the larger periods of sequences, so 
LFSRs are often used in the stream ciphers as the component parts. However, LFSR also has an 
obvious weakness that the each bit in a LFSR’s sequence is linearly related to the initial state, and 
so this implies that the initial state is easy deduced from some of the later bits in the sequence, the 
famous Berlekamp-Massey’s algorithm is such a example of the algorithms. In the almost of 
known attacks such as correlation attacks, algebraic attacks and distinguishing attacks, etc. just 
exploited the weakness of LFSR. So, LFSR-based stream ciphers should interfere the linear 
relations in the bits of the LFSRs, the clock-controlled methods comes from this consideration.  
 
The proposal cipher DICING may be taken as a clock-controlled one, but with a new mechanism 
of altering steps. It consists of a controller and a combiner. In the proposal cipher, we will 
substitute the LFSR with the LFSR-like called projector (Pr.). A projector consists of an element 
tσ  called state from some finite field )2( mGF and an updating rule. The rule of updating states 
is that multiplying tσ  with kx , k is an integer, namely,   
t
k
t x σσ ⋅=+1 .                          (1.1) 
The finite fields used in here are )2( mGF , 126,127,128 orm = . In other word, the operation 
shift in LFSR now is replaced by multiplying kx  in the field )2( mGF .  
The key sizes in DICING can be 128 bits or 256 bits, and the size of initial value may be taken as 
large as 256 bits, and the size of output of DICING is 128 bits.  
 
In this paper the finite field )2(GF  is simply denoted as F , and [ ]xF  is the polynomial ring 
of unknown x over the field F. The symbols ⊕ , ⊗ will represent the bitwise addition XOR, 
bitwise and, that is the operation &  in C , and symbols >>, <<, |  and ~ stand for the 
operations right-shift, left-shift , concatenate and complement respectively. 
Suppose that ζ is a binary string, denoted by biti][ζ and bitji ],[ζ  the i-th bit and the segment 
from i-th bit to j-th bit respectively, and there are the similar expressions bytebyte jii ],[,][ ζζ  and 
wordword jii ],[,][ ζζ  measured in bytes and 32-bits words respectively, and if the meaning is 
explicit from the context, the low-index bit, byte and word will be omitted.  
 
2. Construction    
 
As general stream ciphers, the proposal cipher is also encrypt the plaintext and decrypt the 
ciphertext by adding bitwise a binary string called keystream, namely,  
Ciphertext Plain text Keystream= ⊕                  (2.1) 
The keystream generator contains two main parts, a controller H and a combiner C. The controller 
H is made from two projectors 1Γ , 2Γ  and two counters tD′ , tD ′′  which are also called dices. 
Denoted by tα  and tβ  the states of 1Γ  and 2Γ  in time t  respectively, which come from 
the finite fields 1E  and 2E  respectively, 1 1[ ] / ( )x p x=E F  and 2 2[ ] / ( )x p x=E F , 
)(1 xp  and )(2 xp  are the primitive polynomials with degree 127 and 126 respectively, which 
expression are given in the List 1. They satisfy the simple recurrence equations 
8 8
1 1, , 0,1, 2, .. .i i i ix x iα α β β+ += ⋅ = ⋅ = .          (2.2) 
The dices tD′  and tD ′′  are two integers to record the last eight bits of tα  and tβ  
respectively. The combiner C also contains two projectors 3Γ  and 4Γ , which are based on the 
two finite fields 3E and 4E respectively, 3 3[ ] / ( )x p x=E F , 4 4[ ] / ( )x p x=E F , )(3 xp  and 
)(4 xp are primitive polynomials of degree 128 given in the List 1. Denoted by tω  and tτ the 
states of 3Γ  and 4Γ in the time t  respectively, 3tω ∈E  and 4tτ ∈E . Denoted by 
)( ttt DDD ′′⊕′= , 1 ( &15),ta D= +  1 ( 4)tb D= + >> , they satisfy  
t
b
tt
a
t xx ττωω ⋅=⋅= ++ 11 , .                     (2.3) 
Besides, we use two memorizes tu  and tv to assemble tω and tτ  respectively,  
1 1, , 0t t t t t tu u v v for tω τ− −= ⊕ = ⊕ > ,               (2.4) 
The initial values 0 0 0, , uω τ  and 0v will be specified in the later. 
Suppose that K  is a finite field )2( 8GF , [ ] / ( )x p x=K F , )(xp  is an irreducible 
polynomial of degree eight, which expression is given in the List 1. We define S-box 0 ( )S x as 
127
0 ( ) 5 ( 3) ,S x x x= ⋅ ⊕ ∈K .                  (2.5) 
We also adopt the representation )(0 ζS  for a bytes string ζ to represent that S-box 0S  
substitute each byte of the string ζ . 
The startup includes two subprocesses keysetup and ivsetup, where the basic materials as the 
secret key and key-size will be input and the internal states will be initialized. Besides, in the 
keysetup we will make a key-defined the S-box ( )S x from 0 ( )S x and a diffusion transformation 
L . The process is as following.  
For a string ρ of 8 bytes, we define an 8-bits vector Vρ  and a 8 8× matrix M ρ : 
[ ] [8 ] ,0 8,bitV i i i iρ ρ= + ≤ <        u lM T J Tρ = ⋅ ⋅ .             (2.6) 
where 88, )( ×= jiu aT  and , 8 8( )l i jT b ×= are the upper-triangular matrix and the lower-triangular 
matrix respectively,  
, ,
[8 ] , [8 ] ,
1 , 1 ,
0 , 0 ,
bit bit
i j i j
i j if i j i j if i j
a if i j b if i j
if i j if i j
ρ ρ+ < + >⎧ ⎧⎪ ⎪= = = =⎨ ⎨⎪ ⎪> <⎩ ⎩
      (2.7) 
and J is a key-defined permutation matrix, for the simplicity, here take 1.J =   
Suppose that K  is the secret key, let [0,15] [16,31]byte byteK Kλ = ⊕ , if | | 256K = , else 
[0,15]byteKλ = , and [0,7] , [8,15]byte byteλ λ λ λ′ ′′= = ,define two affine transformations on K  
                   ( ) ( ), ( ) ( ),A x M x B x M x xλ λ′ ′′= = ∈K .             (2.8) 
 Denoted by 1 ,V V Vλ λ′ ′′= ⊕ and 2 8( ,1)V V ROTL Vλ λ′ ′′= ⊕ , and then define a new S-box 
( )S x and a transformation L on 4K , 
0 2 1( ) ( ) ,
A B A A B
B A A B A
S x S x V V L
A A B A B
A B A B A
⊕⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⊕⎜ ⎟= ⊕ ⊕ = ⎜ ⎟⊕⎜ ⎟⊕⎝ ⎠
.    (2.9) 
Suppose that ζ is a string of n bytes, if 4n k=  we also view it as a string of k words, and 
write ( )L ζ to represent that L takes on the each word of ζ . Simply, we denote  
( ) ( )Q L Sζ ζ= ⋅ .                       (2.10) 
In the ivsetup , the second step of the startup, the internal states will be initialized with the secret 
key and the initial value. In the generating keystream we will employ one mask of 16 bytes, which 
are denoted by η .  
For a 32-bytes string ζ we define a bytes permutation φ : ( )φζ φ ζ= , [ ] [4 mod31]i iφζ ζ= , 
for 0 31i≤ < , and [31] [31]φζ ζ= . Let Kˆ K= if 256K =  else ˆ | ( )K K K= ∼ , denoted 
by ˆ ˆ(~ [16,31] ) | (~ [0,15] )byte byteK K K=

. We define the functions  
ˆ( ) ( ( )), ( ) ( ( ( ) ) ).F Q G F F F K Kζ φ ζ ζ ζ= = ⊕ ⊕            (2.11)   
Suppose that IV is the initial value of 32-bytes, e is the base of natural logarithm and c the 
integral part of 57!e ⋅ , and , 0 3i iξ ≤ ≤ , are four 32-bytes strings defined as  
0 1( ), ( ), 1, 2,3.i iG IV c G c iξ ξ ξ −= ⊕ = ⊕ =            (2.12) 
The internal states are initialized respectively as following 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 3[0,15] [16,31], ( , ) , ( , ) , ( , ) ,u vη ξ ξ ξ α β ξ ω τ ξ′= ⊕ = = =      (2.13) 
where 2 2 2[0,126] | [128,253]ξ ξ ξ′ = , i.e. 0 2 0 2[0,126], [128,253].α ξ β ξ= =   
If 3 0,ξ = the states 0ω and 0τ will be re-set as  
0 0
ˆ( , ) Kω τ = .                           (2.14) 
.Note   For a secret key, there is at most one IV such that 3 0.ξ =  
After initializing, the process enters the recurrence part of generating keystream, each cycle 
includes two sub-processes of updating and combining. In the updating, all the states are updated 
from the time 1t −  to the time t  as stated in (2.2) ~ (2.4). Suppose that u and v  are two 
16-bytes strings, which are also viewed as 4 4×  matrices of bytes in the ordinary way. Denoted 
by TM the transposition of a matrix M , the combining function is defined as  
( , ) (( ( ) ) ) .TC u v Q Q u v η= ⊕ ⊕                     (2.15) 
Denoted by tz the keystream in the time t , ( 0)t > , then  
( , )t t tz C u v= .                           (2.16) 
We have summarized the whole process in a sketch as Fig. 1. 
 
 
List of the Primitive Polynomials used 
 
                           
Polynomials               Expression 
)(xp  1568 ++++ xxxx  
)(1 xp  127 89 41 3( 1)( 1)x x x x+ + + +  
)(2 xp  126 83 35 7( 1)( 1)x x x x+ + + +  
)(3 xp  128 96 67 32 3( 1)( 1)x x x x x+ + + + +  
)(4 xp  128 96 64 37 7 5( 1)( 1)x x x x x x+ + + + + +  
 
List 1 
 
 
The Sketch of Encryption Process 
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Fig.1 
 
 
3.  Security Analysis 
 
In this section, we firstly show some results about the periods of the keystream of the stream 
cipher Dicing, and then give an investigation with respect to standard cryptanalytic attacks. 
This is the 
recurrence part 
 Denote ( )tzπ  as the period of a sequence tz . 
 
Proposition 1   
126 127( ) (2 1)(2 1),tDπ = − −                          (3.1) 
126 127 128( ) ( ) (2 1)(2 1)(2 1) / 3t tπ ω π τ= = − − −                 (3.2) 
 
Proof.  Note that polynomials )(1 xp  and )(2 xp  are primitive, and the order of x  in the 
fields 1E  and 2E  are 12
127 −  and 12126 −  respectively, hence  
                          127 126( ) 2 1, ( ) 2 1t tπ α π β= − = − ,                 (3.3)  
and equation (3.1) is followed for 126 127(2 1,2 1) 1− − = . 
Write 1 i
k
i i xω ω −= ⋅ , and let )12)(12( 126127 −−=n , 
0
i
i n
m k
< ≤
= ∑ , it is easy to calculate that 
for each integer , 1 16c c< ≤ , the occurrence times of c  in the sum above is 
249 123 1222 2 2− −  and integer 1 occurs one more times than the number. Thus, 
249 123 122(2 2 2 ) 136 1m = − − ⋅ + ,                     (3.4) 
and  
                            
1241 2 5 17
0 0
m
n x xω ω ω − ⋅ ⋅= ⋅ = ⋅                        (3.5) 
In the field 3E or 4E , the order of x  is equal to 
1282 1− , and 128 124(2 1,2 5 17 1) 3− ⋅ ⋅ − = , 
the formula (3.2) is followed.                                                    ? 
 
Note that 1 1, ,t t t t t tu u v vω τ− −⊕ = ⊕ =  so we have  
 
Corollary 1 
126 127 128( ), ( ) (2 1)(2 1)(2 1) / 3t tu vπ π ≥ − − − .               (3.6) 
 
In the next, we give a discussion for Dicing in respect to the resistance to the main known attacks. 
 
We known that the correlation equations of the components in combining or filter functions should 
be known is required for the correlation attack, distinguishing attack and algebraic attack. In the 
proposed cipher, the updating of the components tω  and tτ  are controlled by Pr.’s 1Γ  and 
2Γ , and their correlations are not known for the adversaries, so these attacks will not be feasible.  
 
As Dicing has a larger size of internal states, and their updating operations are multiplications of 
the finite field 128(2 )GF , and there are no the correspondences between some smaller isolated 
parts of the states and the keystream, hence there will be no flaws for the time/memory/data 
trade-off attacks and guess-and-determine attacks.   
 
The initialization and combining functions also have protected DICING against the chosen-IV 
attacks, collision attacks and inversion attacks.  
 
With our reference code, there are not found remarkable timing gaps for timing attack. 
 
4. Implementation 
 
In the platform of 32-bit Windows OS and AMD Athlon(tm) 64 x2 Dual Core processor 3600+, 
2.00G Borland C++ 5.0, the performance of DICING is as following  
 
Report of Performance 
 
Sub-processes                 Time or Rate 
Keysetup                  5200 cycles 
IVsetup                  2280 cycles 
Keystream Rate            10 cycles/byte or 160 cycles/block 
 
List 2 
 
5. The reduced versions and variants of DICING 
 
The algorithm DICING presented above is a very conservative one, the users who wish to strive 
for a faster rate may adopt the reduced versions and variants. In the following are some such ones, 
and we think the reduced one will also have sufficient security. 
1.  Simply take the combining function 
   ( , ) ( ) ,C u v Q u v= ⊕                             (5.1) 
and omit the Pr. 2Γ .  
2.  In the case there are no attacks for conditional branching, the combining function may be 
taken as 
( ) [0] 0,
( , )
( ) [0] 1.
Q u v if
C u v
Q v u if
α
α
⊕ =⎧= ⎨ ⊕ =⎩                   (5.2) 
3. Furthermore, omit both Pr. 1Γ  and  Pr. 2Γ , and instead, let  
[15] [15].dice ω τ= ⊕                            (5.3) 
4. To obtain a larger period of keystream, the two Pr.’s , 3Γ   and 4Γ  may be replaced by a 
Pr. Γˆ from a finite field 256(2 )GF , i.e. ˆ[ ] / ( )x p xF , ˆ ( )p x  is a primitive polynomial of 
degree 256 . For 32-bit processors, ˆ ( )p x may be taken as  
256 224 192 161 128 96 67 32 6ˆ ( ) ( 1)( 1)p x x x x x x x x x x= + + + + + + + + + .      (5.4) 
 
The presented algorithm DICING was one of candidates for eSTREAM [1], [2], but with a little 
difference from [2] in (2.8) and (2.9), here the vector 1V has been moved into S-box ( )S x from 
the transformation ( )A x .  
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